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ABSTRACT  
 
Cloud computing is a rapidly evolving information technology (IT) phenomenon. Rather than 
procure, deploy and manage a physical IT infrastructure to host their software applications, 
organizations are increasingly deploying their infrastructure into remote, virtualized 
environments, often hosted and managed by third parties. This development has significant 
implications for digital forensic investigators, equipment vendors, law enforcement, as well as 
corporate compliance and audit departments (among others). Much of digital forensic practice 
assumes careful control and management of IT assets (particularly data storage) during the 
conduct of an investigation. This paper summarises the key aspects of cloud computing and 
analyses how established digital forensic procedures will be invalidated in this new environment. 
Several new research challenges addressing this changing context are also identified and 
discussed. 
 
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Cloud Computing, Cloud Forensics, Investigation Model, ACPO 
Guidelines, Digital Forensics Research Conference.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Cloud computing technologies have significant potential to revolutionise the way organizations 
provision their information technology (IT) infrastructure. Migration to cloud computing 
involves replacing much of the traditional IT hardware found in an organization’s data centre 
(including servers, racks, network switches and air conditioning units) with virtualized, remote, 
on-demand software services, configured for the particular needs of the organization. These 
services can be hosted and managed by the user organization (on a reduced hardware base), or by 
a third-party provider. Consequently, the software and data comprising the organization’s 
application may be physically stored across many different locations, potentially with a wide 
geographic distribution.  
There have been several predictions of substantial market growth in cloud services over the 
next few years. Gens has speculated that spending on cloud services will grow by 30% in 2011 
(Gens, 2010). A Gartner press release forecast cloud service worldwide revenue to reach $68.3 
billion in 2010, an increase of 16.6% from the 2009 revenue of $58.6 billion, and goes on to 
claim that cloud service revenues will reach $148.8 billion in 2014 (Pring, Brown, Leong, 
Biscotti, Couture, Lheureux, Frank, Roster, Cournoyer, & Liu, 2010). A study at the end of 2010 
predicted that within the next three years, approximately 40% of Small and Medium Businesses 
(SMBs) expect to be using three or more cloud services and will have migrated their data into the 
cloud (Kazarian & Hanlon, 2011). There is some speculation that new and SMBs will benefit the 
most in the coming years, with cloud computing allowing these organizations to utilize 
appropriately scaled IT infrastructure that was previously only accessible to larger corporations 
(Schubert, Jeffery, & Neidecker-Lutz, 2010). 
The use of cloud computing has potential benefits to organizations, including increased 
flexibility and efficiency. Virtualized services provide greater flexibility over an in-house 
physical IT infrastructure, because services can be rapidly re-configured or scaled to meet new 
and evolving requirements without the need to acquire new and potentially redundant hardware.  
Complementary to this, the use of cloud computing can reduce the costs of providing IT services, 
by eliminating redundant computing power and storage, reducing support requirements and 
reducing fixed capital commitments. Khajeh-Hosseini et al. found that a 37% cost saving could 
be obtained by an organization who chose to migrate their IT infrastructure from an outsourced 
data-centre to the Amazon Cloud (Khajeh-Hosseini, Greenwood, & Sommerville, 2010).  
However, the use of cloud computing presents significant challenges to the users of clouds 
(both individuals and organizations), as well as regulatory and law enforcement authorities.  It 
has been estimated that cybercrime will cost the British economy £27 billion per year in the 
coming years, with businesses accounting for nearly £21 billion of losses, largely due to the theft 
of intellectual property and espionage (Detica, 2011).  It is likely that users of cloud computing 
services and technologies will be exposed to similar risks. The security of confidential corporate 
and private data remains one of the greatest concerns organizations have when they consider 
cloud computing (Butler, Heckman, & Thorp, 2010). Recent reports have noted Botnet attacks 
on Amazon’s cloud infrastructure (Amazon Web Services, 2009). The compromise of the Gmail 
email service by (alleged) Chinese hackers (Blumenthal, 2010) illustrates that cloud computing 
platforms are already a target for malicious activities.  
When security breaches, attacks or policy violations occur, it may be necessary to conduct a 
digital forensic investigation. However, existing digital forensic principles, frameworks, 
practices and tools are largely intended for off-line investigation.  In particular, these approaches 
assume that the storage media under investigation is completely within the control of the 
investigator. Conducting investigations in a cloud computing environment presents new 
challenges, since evidence is likely to be ephemeral and stored on media beyond the immediate 
control of an investigator. This paper raises the awareness on the challenges posed by cloud 
computing technologies for digital forensics through an analysis of the applicability of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) digital forensics principles and the Digital 
Forensics Research Conference (DFRW) Investigative Process Model (DIP Model) to a cloud 
computing context. These two frameworks are commonly cited as the basis of good digital 
forensic practice (Hunton, 2011; Ieong, 2006; Owen & Thomas, 2011; Reyes, O'Shea, Steele, 
Hansen, Jean, & Ralph, 2007). The paper identifies numerous aspects of these approaches that 
are problematic in a cloud context and proposes several immediate areas of research that the 
authors believe is fundamental to further understand digital forensic investigations in the cloud. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the aspects of cloud computing 
technologies that are pertinent to a digital forensic investigation. Section 3 reviews existing 
digital forensic process models, and notes the key assumptions made regarding the environment 
under investigation and Section 4 assesses how the adoption of cloud computing may invalidate 
the assumptions made in these models. A review of related work is presented in Section 5, 
illustrating how some of these challenges concerning cloud computing which we identify are 
beginning to be addressed. Section 6 discusses some further avenues of research to address the 
issues raised by the analysis. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions and summarises the key 
challenges in conducting digital forensic investigations in cloud environments. 
 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
A cloud has several uses, offering a variety of services and can be deployed in more than one 
way. Consequently, several definitions of cloud computing have been proposed (Mell & Grance, 
2011; Schubert, et al., 2010; Wyld, 2009).  
 
Schubert et al. define cloud computing as: 
 
a ‘cloud’ is an elastic execution environment of resources involving multiple stakeholders 
and providing a metered service at multiple granularities for a specified level of quality (of 
service). (Schubert, et al., 2010) 
 
The Open Cloud Manifesto Consortium defines the key aspects of cloud computing as: 
 
the ability to scale and provision computing power dynamically in a cost-efficient way and 
the ability of the consumer (end user, organization, or IT staff) to make the most of that 
power without having to manage the underlying complexity of the technology. (The Open 
Cloud Manifesto Consortium, 2009). 
 
The key aspects from a digital forensic perspective is that a cloud is defined as a scalable, 
virtualized, distributed computing platform, whose shared resources are accessed remotely by 
users through a network. 
 
There are three main levels of service for users of cloud computing (Mell & Grance, 2011): 
 
 in the Software as a Service (SaaS) model, a client can make use of software applications 
made available from the cloud provider. Typically, users interact with SaaS applications 
using a web-browser. An example of SaaS is the Google Apps
i
 suite offered by Google. 
Clients can use this service to deploy an email and collaboration platform within their 
organizations, and make use of Google Docs, Calendar, Gmail and other productivity 
applications. All data generated by the use of the applications is stored in the cloud; 
 
 the Platform as a Service (PaaS) model provides an application programming interface 
(API) for clients to create and host custom-built applications. An example of PaaS is the 
Google App Engine
ii
, which provides a platform for developers to create and host web-
based applications. PaaS also includes cloud providers offering database management 
systems such as Amazon SimpleDB
iii
; and 
 
 the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model is the leasing of virtualized computing 
resources such as processing power, volatile memory and persistent storage space to host 
virtual machines. IaaS products include Amazon EC2
iv
, which allows clients to create 
and launch virtual machines running a variety of operating systems. These can then be 
loaded with customer-specified applications, just as for any other server. The virtual 
machine image can be stored and re-deployed, according to the client's requirements. 
 
The manner in which services are deployed in a cloud can influence the evidence available to 
an investigator and the way it is collected. For example, IaaS platforms present an interface to a 
user that is indistinguishable from that of a remote physical server. However, the data that 
represents an IaaS-based server is inherently more volatile. Alternatively, the SaaS and PaaS 
models restrict the flexibility with which users can interact with a cloud platform, by offering a 
restricted set of applications, or specifying the constraints within which new software can be 
created.  The storage of data on these services is not by the user, but instead by the cloud owner. 
In addition to the different levels of deployment, a cloud can be categorised by its  
organizational deployment, with consequent impact on the geographical location and storage 
architecture of data held (Krutz & Vines, 2010): 
 
 in a private cloud, the infrastructure is operated solely by the organization who owns the 
cloud. This cloud will likely be found within the same premises as the owning 
organization and be within its administrative control, and include only that same 
organization’s data; 
 
 a community cloud is shared between several organizations, either because of a common 
organizational goal, or in order to pool IT resources. Community clouds may be located 
within one or more of the community organization’s premises, and will be administered 
by the community; 
 
 public clouds will usually be owned by a provider organization, which will maintain the 
cloud facilities in one or more corporate data centres.  The administrative control of the 
cloud resources will therefore reside with the provider, rather than the user. Consumers 
will lease virtual storage and compute resources from the provider as required. A public 
cloud will therefore likely contain data from more than one user; and 
 
 a hybrid cloud is a composition of two or more of the above deployment options. Hybrid 
clouds can be used to provide load balancing to multiple clouds. For example, an 
organization may have exhausted the available resources within its private cloud, and so 
incorporate resources available on lease from a public cloud. 
 
A consequence of these different organizational configurations may have an impact on the 
way that data can be collected as evidence.  In particular, the data held in a cloud may be 
physically stored in one or more geographically distributed locations, making the determination 
of which legal framework and procedures to apply to the evidence gathering process difficult. 
In summary, multiple deployment options and the variety of services offered to cloud users 
introduce new challenges when conducting digital forensic investigations in these environments.  
The next section of this paper summarises various models used in digital forensic investigations. 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT DIGITAL FORENSIC PROCESS MODELS 
 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (Association of Chief Police Officers & 7Safe, 2007) 
propose four principles of digital forensic practice: 
 
1. No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should change data held on 
a computer or storage media, which may subsequently be relied upon in court. 
2. In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or on storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give 
evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions. 
3. An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer-based electronic 
evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party should be able to 
examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
4. The person in-charge of the investigation (the case officer) has overall responsibility for 
ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
 
These guidelines are primarily intended for law enforcement investigators, but have also been 
adopted by the digital forensics community in the United Kingdom (UK). There is an 
expectation that evidence used in courts produced from a digital forensic investigation will be 
gathered by following these guidelines (although it is unclear how this determination is made in 
practice). 
Since 2001, various frameworks and process models have also been proposed for conducting 
a digital forensics investigation (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2004; Carrier & Spafford, 2003, 
2004; Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002). The First Digital Forensics Research Conference (DFRW) 
defined the term ‘digital forensics’ and proposed the DFRW Investigative Process (DIP) Model, 
which they deemed could be applied to all investigations in both research and practitioners 
(Palmer, 2001). This was the first attempt to define how a digital forensics investigation should 
be conducted. The model identifies a linear process, which includes stages of:  identification, 
preservation, collection, examination, analysis and presentation. As Palmer (2001) noted, the 
conference agreed that this model still required further work and as such was not deemed 
complete. 
The Abstract Digital Forensics Model builds on the work from the DFRW and is effectively 
an expansion of the DIP Model (Reith, et al., 2002). It adds preparation, approach strategy and 
returning evidence phases to the DIP Model, as well as describing the phases, something that the 
DIP Model lacked.  
Carrier and Spafford (2003) proposed the Integrated Digital Investigation Process, based upon 
“theories and techniques from the physical investigation world”. This model is based upon on 
‘physical crime scene’ principles and methods and consists of 17 phases that are broken into five 
groups: readiness, deployment, physical crime scene investigation, digital crime scene 
investigation and review. 
Finally, The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model is an enhancement of the model 
proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2003), consisting of five major phases (Baryamureeba & 
Tushabe, 2004): 
 
 the readiness phases is concerned with ensuring the investigator has the correct training 
and infrastructure to handle an investigation; 
 
 the deployment phases specifies means for detecting an incident has occurred and 
beginning the process of conducting an investigation; 
 
 during the traceback phases the crime scene is examined and the devices worthy of 
investigation are discovered; 
 
 the dynamite phases is associated with collecting and analysing items seized from the 
crime scene and collecting evidence from these devices; and 
 
 the review phases is concerned with reviewing the entire investigation and discovering 
areas of improvement. 
 
All of these guidelines were developed prior to the advent of cloud technologies and largely 
assume that the investigator has physical access and control over the target system or device, and 
in particular, its storage media. This assumption is likely to be invalidated when investigating 
activity in a cloud environment. 
 
DIGITAL FORENSICS IN CLOUD ENVIRONMENTS 
 
This section analyses the challenges raised by cloud computing with respect to existing models 
of digital forensic investigations described above. The following discussion is based principally 
on the DFRW Investigative Process (DIP) Model and the ACPO principles and guidelines. The 
DIP model provides a comprehensive review of the stages employed in the digital forensic 
process, and so is convenient for analysing the impact of cloud forensics on this process. Other 
models are also referenced where appropriate, in particular the ACPO principles and guidelines. 
The issues raised concerning cloud computing in each of the phases of a digital forensic 
investigation are summarised in Table 1. The analysis demonstrates that many of the 
assumptions incorporated into existing models of forensic investigation are not valid in the 
context of cloud computing. 
  
Identification 
 
The first step of the DIP model is the determination that a potential criminal or improper act has 
taken place involving computer-based systems. These events may relate to traditional crimes or 
activity augmented by the use of IT, or IT-specific crimes. Identification may result from, for 
example, complaints made by individuals, anomalies detected by Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS), monitoring and profiling or because of an audit of a computer system. Although the 
identification phase is not just concerned with digital forensics, it does have an impact on how 
the investigation is conducted as well as defining the purpose for conducting the investigation. 
The detection of suspicious events in a cloud will depend on the deployment model adopted 
and the form of cloud services (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) used. The deployment of conventional 
intrusion detection systems in a cloud has been proposed by several authors (Roschke, Cheng, & 
Meinel, 2009; Vieira, Schulter, Westphall, & Westphall, 2010). Such systems could be deployed 
by users of IaaS clouds, or by providers in SaaS or PaaS clouds. In a private cloud infrastructure, 
providers may be better placed to tune the IDS for the particular suite of services deployed which 
meets the organization’s needs. For public clouds, a multi-layered strategy may be necessary.  
Users can monitor for suspicious events occurring with the services they are using. Providers can 
monitor the underlying infrastructure used to host the cloud, and therefore detect much larger 
attacks that could affect a much larger audience. 
 
Preservation and Collection 
 
A digital forensic investigation is concerned with collecting data from computer-based systems 
that can later be constituted as evidence that a crime or other illicit act has been committed.  
Legal convention and forensic standards, such as the Daubert principles (Marsico, 2004), require 
that forensic evidence be testable, and that the methods used to produce evidence be repeatable. 
Consequently, the preservation phase of the DIP model defines activities prior to data collection 
to ensure the integrity of data throughout the investigation life cycle, i.e. assurance that the 
evidence is an accurate representation of the data found on the computer system.  Several aspects 
of the preservation phase are affected by the use of a cloud environment. 
 
    Storage Capacity 
 
In conventional investigations, a pre-requisite of evidence preservation is to have available 
sufficient secure storage capacity for the data gathered to be archived. Several authors have 
noted that the growing amounts of data gathered during forensic investigations, driven by 
increased device capacity and reduced cost, is increasingly challenging for investigators (Richard 
& Roussev, 2006; Roussev, Wang, Richard, & Marziale, 2009; Sommer, 2004). This increase 
imposes extra costs on investigators with the responsibility to store and curate the data, quite 
apart from the increasing amount of investigator time required to examine it. 
The use of cloud environments will likely exacerbate the problem of data storage. An 
attractive aspect of cloud environments for users is the elastic ability to dynamically scale a 
service’s storage capabilities according to on-going requirements.  From a user’s perspective, a 
typical public IaaS cloud appears to offer limitless data storage capability as and when the user 
requires it. An investigator may be faced with gathering an extremely large amount of data 
placed in a cloud by a user. 
One solution investigating authorities could resort to is the use of public clouds to store 
evidence. This too will bring its own challenges, from both a legal and technical perspective. 
Investigators will need to address the rules and regulations regarding data protection and privacy 
issues, and their impact on evidence stored in the cloud. 
The adoption of triaging techniques has also been proposed as a means of reducing the 
amount of data to be analysed by an investigator (Pearson & Watson, 2010) and is already being 
adopted to reduce backlogs in conventional investigations (Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, & Wedge, 
2006). This approach may be particularly appropriate in situations that require urgent responses, 
such as kidnappings, when the long-term integrity and reliability of evidence is less important.  
 
 
 
Phase Action Challenges 
 
Identification 
 
Identifying an illicit event 
 
Lack of frameworks 
   
Preservation Software tools Lack of specialist tools 
Sufficient storage capacity Distributed, virtualized and volatile storage; 
use of cloud services to store evidence 
 
Chain of custody Cross-jurisdictional standards, procedures; 
proprietary technology 
 
Media imaging Imaging all physical media in a cloud is 
impractical; partial imaging may face legal 
challenges 
  
Time synchronization Evidence from multiple time zones 
 
Legal authority Data stored in multiple jurisdictions; limited 
access to physical media 
  
Approved methods, software and 
hardware 
Lack of evaluation, certification generally, but 
particularly in cloud context 
 
Live vs. Dead acquisitions Acquisition of physical media from providers 
is cumbersome, onerous and time consuming 
data is inherently volatile 
 
Data integrity Lack of write-blocking or enforced persistence 
mechanisms for cloud services and data 
 
Examination Software tools Lack of tested and certified tools 
 
Recovery of deleted data Privacy regulations and mechanisms 
implemented by  providers 
 
Traceability and event reconstruction Events may occur on many different platforms 
 
Presentation Documentation of evidence Integration of multiple evidence sources in 
record 
 
Testimony Complexity of explaining cloud technology to 
jury 
   
 
Table 1: Summary of Challenges to Digital Forensics in Cloud Environments 
 
 
The proposed approach permits investigators to conduct examinations of storage devices in a 
short period in order to identify the most valuable evidence without performing a full forensic 
investigation. 
The Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) is a framework proposed to 
perform triage on digital devices (Rogers, et al., 2006). CFFTPM works by accessing 
information located in a user’s ‘home directory’ on the file system, which contains user-
application centric information. Other sources of information used in the CFFTPM include the 
registry, operating system and application logs, all of which can contain timestamp information. 
The CFFTPM will likely not transfer directly to the context of a cloud environment, since 
user-centric application data may be stored in the cloud, cached on the user’s client computer, or 
both. Adopting a triage approach may require an investigator to conduct a live examination of 
this data in the cloud environment while the client is still connected. The implications of a live 
investigation are discussed further below in the context of data acquisition. 
 
   Chain of Custody 
 
During a conventional forensic investigation, accepted practice is to establish and maintain a 
‘chain of custody’ for evidence, which is defined as:  
 
a roadmap that shows how evidence was collected, analysed and preserved in order to be 
presented as evidence in court. (Vacca, 2005)  
 
A properly maintained chain of custody therefore provides the documentary history for the 
entire lifetime of evidence discovered during an investigation. ACPO guidelines stipulate that the 
documentation include how the evidence was gathered and managed, by whom and when. 
In a conventional investigation, the chain of custody begins when an investigator assumes 
physical control of digital electronic artefacts (and any incorporated storage devices) that is 
suspected to be pertinent to the investigation. Subsequently, there are two methods of preserving 
data on a personal computer (Kruse, Warren, & Jay, 2001): powering down the computer by 
issuing a command to the operating system causing a staged shutdown, and removing the power 
source, causing an immediate halt. Storage devices can then be removed from the computer and 
examined separately. The chain of custody documentation will typically refer to these devices, 
which can be isolated and disconnected from a power supply with little risk of loss of evidence. 
The remote nature of cloud services means that this assumption is not valid in the context of a 
cloud environment. Services can be accessed by any system with a network connection to the 
hosting cloud. Unless an investigator is able to gain control of and disable a service, evidence 
could be destroyed relatively quickly, either by a service user, or by the cloud provider. To the 
authors’ knowledge, there has been little work by either researchers or practitioners to examine 
the practicality of obtaining control of a cloud service during an on-going forensic investigation.  
Challenges in this context include the speed with which an investigator can gain control of a 
service, and the appropriate legal and regulatory framework that should be developed to enable 
this capability. 
 
 
 
 
   Digital Image Acquisition 
 
Assuming that the investigator has gained control of the cloud service it is necessary to obtain an 
accurate copy of the data held by the service for later analysis. Both the DIP Model and ACPO 
guidelines assume the use of ‘forensic imaging’ to obtain copies of a storage device’s contents 
without alteration of the source (Association of Chief Police Officers & 7Safe, 2007; Palmer, 
2001). Typically, a storage device is connected to an investigator’s own computer via a write-
blocker as shown in Figure 1a. A byte-for-byte copy of the entire device (an image) is then made 
using a software tool such as AccessData’s FTK Imagerv or the open-source tool ddvi. If multiple 
copies of the image are taken, digital hashes of each image can be taken to check whether the 
source image has been changed.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Digital image acquisition in traditional (a) and cloud computing environments (b) 
 
The collection of evidence from a cloud environment is likely to pose a challenge to 
investigators. Triage tools, volatile and persistent memory acquisition software, as used in 
conventional investigations, on a client computer may provide minimal data.  
The virtualization of data storage in a cloud makes it complex to identify and isolate the 
portions of the one or more physical storage devices owned by a cloud provider that represent the 
user’s data that should be gathered for analysis. Virtualized data stored on a cloud may be spread 
between many different physical devices and an interface between the virtual storage and the 
investigator could exist (Figure 1b). For example, Google have employed the Google File 
System (GFS) to store their customer’s data in the cloud (Ghemawat, Gobioff, & Leung, 2003).  
To customers, data appears to be stored in a single location; however, physically this is not the 
case. GFS is a “multi-tenant distributed” file system which means that even if two users are 
within the same organization, their data could well reside in two or more different physical 
locations (Google, 2010).  
The ACPO guidelines envisage the entire storage device containing relevant information to be 
collected (Association of Chief Police Officers & 7Safe, 2007). Acquiring all such storage 
devices from a cloud environment could be both cumbersome and time consuming for the 
investigator, and disruptive for the provider.  The amount of data collected could also be very 
large, particularly in relation to the amount of relevant data contained. Fundamentally, cloud 
services only offer remote access to a logical representation of data, rather than the underlying 
physical infrastructure. This limitation is likely to be complicated further by the provision of 
cloud services whose infrastructure is itself virtualized and leased from other cloud providers 
(Bessani, Correia, Quaresma, André, & Sousa, 2011). Logistically, it appears inevitable that 
methods will be needed which allow for only a partial recovery of data from any one physical 
device. Such a method would need to be developed in accordance with accepted forensic 
principles. In particular, the risk of conducting an investigation with incomplete data must be 
addressed (Carrier & Spafford, 2004).  
This use of virtualization also affects the privacy of other users of the cloud, whose data may 
be inadvertently gathered during the investigation. In some jurisdictions, inadvertent access of 
non-relevant data from a cloud environment may contravene local privacy and/or data protection 
legislation.  
The preceding discussion has assumed that the investigator conducts a ‘dead acquisition’ on a 
physically isolated storage device. However, frequently used data may be stored in volatile 
memory on the cloud, or be cached by a user’s computer during interactions with cloud services. 
‘Live’ acquisitions and investigations are an alternative approach, in which data is examined on 
the target computer while it is still powered up. This approach enables investigators to gather 
data that might otherwise be lost if a computer is powered down, particularly: 
 
 data stored in non-persistent memory, such as processes and information on active 
network connections; and  
 
 temporary data stored in persistent memory, such as application file locks, and web-
browsing caches. 
 
The use of live acquisition techniques may increase the amount of information an investigator 
is able to extract from a cloud client computer, particularly if it has an open connection to a 
cloud environment. However, digital image acquisition could be further hampered by the use of 
encryption in cloud-based environments. With many organizations reluctant to adopt cloud 
services and storage until concerns about data confidentiality and integrity is met (Kamara & 
Lauter, 2010), cloud service providers are turning towards encryption as a means of offering this 
security to their customers. Several cloud storage providers such as SpiderOak
vii
 have 
implemented a ‘zero knowledge system’ such that all data is encrypted client-side before being 
transmitted and stored in the cloud, furthermore, the keys used to encrypt data are never stored in 
the cloud (Agudo, Nuñez, Giammatteo, Rizomiliotis, & Lambrinoudakis, 2011). This means 
serving a cloud storage provider with a court order to decrypt such information could prove 
fruitless as only the owner of the data can provide the key to decrypt this information. If further 
cloud providers deploy such an encryption system as a means assuring customers their data is 
safe, evidence in digital images created could reveal encrypted blocks of data of no forensic 
value to investigators unless encryption keys can be recovered. 
 
   Deleted Data 
 
The cloud could both assist and hamper investigators attempts to recover data that is deleted or 
would otherwise have been deleted by the suspect. Unlike a hard drive or USB flash drive, which 
a suspect has physical access and can therefore be physically destroyed; this is not the case with 
the cloud. Unless the suspect has the knowledge and administrative authority to delete or 
‘destroy’ data, this evidence will remain available to the investigator.  
In conventional investigations, data that a user has attempted to delete (but which still resides 
on a storage device) is often a rich source of evidence. However, the volatility and elasticity of 
cloud environments make the recovery of deleted data challenging. Some cloud providers 
maintain that user privacy is a priority within their cloud environments (Google, 2010). For 
example, Google’s current policy regarding deleted data is such that once a user deletes their 
data from Google Services, that data is then deleted from both active and replication servers. 
Pointers to this data are also deleted, making tracing remnants of user deleted data extremely 
difficult. 
The European Commission is encouraging European Union member states to implement the 
Data Retention Directive (European Union, May 2006). Article 5 of this directive requires 
member states to ensure that communication providers shall retain certain information about its 
users, including the “userID”, “IP address allocated at the time of the communication” as well 
“the date and time of the log-in and log-off of the service” (European Union, May 2006). Cloud 
providers are not explicitly mentioned in the directive. However, should they be encompassed by 
the umbrella definition of ‘communication providers’, they too will also need to retain specific 
information related to clients. 
 
   Cross-Organizational Cooperation 
 
If it is not possible for an investigator to obtain personal control of a cloud service, it may be 
possible to obtain an image of the service’s data from the cloud provider. However, this 
approach is problematic for several reasons. Using the cloud provider to obtain the image means 
that the investigator does not initially control the chain of custody documentation. A complete 
chain of custody should identify all individuals who have come in contact with the evidence. 
Consequently, if the cloud provider is used to obtain the initial image, then the chain of custody 
begins with the employees assigned to this task. The second principle in the ACPO guidelines 
states that the individual responsible for acquiring evidence must be competent to do so 
(although the guidelines are not explicit about what constitutes competency). It is unclear how an 
investigator would be satisfied that the cloud provider’s employees were competent to gather 
evidence on their behalf.  
The cross-organizational nature of this approach to evidence gathering from cloud 
environments has other implications. The investigator may have difficulty establishing the 
training and experience of the cloud providers employees assigned to assisting the investigation, 
particularly if the standards adopted within the provider organization are not directly comparable 
to those of the investigator. The use of proprietary technologies by cloud providers may make the 
involvement of the provider in the investigation essential. For example, parts of the GFS are 
considered proprietary business information. Investigators may require the cooperation of cloud 
providers to locate evidence. Consequently, the reliability and quality of the chain of custody 
may be insufficient for the investigator’s purposes. 
This problem is exacerbated if the cloud provider is hosted in a different jurisdiction to that of 
the investigator, since different legal norms and practices may govern the provider’s behaviour.  
A local search warrant to search and seize evidence may not give the investigator the right to do 
the same with evidence located in different jurisdictions, even though the evidence is accessible 
via the Internet (K. Wang, 2010). For example, Amazon stores data from customers in the 
European Union in its cloud services in the Republic of Ireland (Wauters, 2008). This means that 
an investigator seeking evidence concerning a cloud user will need to work with the authorities 
in that jurisdiction. Such a request may take some time, by which time the evidence could be lost 
or deliberately destroyed. 
A partial solution may be for cloud providers to have individuals within their organization, 
who are trained and qualified to perform forensic investigations should the need arise. These 
individuals can then begin a chain of custody, which will be passed onto the investigating party.  
However, it is unclear how the cloud provider will defray the costs of providing this service. It 
may be necessary for such services to be mandated by legislation.  
The preservation phase also includes the reconciliation of timing information concerning 
digital evidence, in particular from time stamps in file system meta-data, and from application 
log files on one or more computer systems. This information can be used to re-construct the 
sequence of events concerning a suspicious event. 
For an investigator to re-construct an accurate time-line of events on the device or system, the 
correct time and time zone need to be established. In a cloud environment, establishing this 
information could be challenging. Public clouds will potentially store evidence in a distributed 
manner across various physical locations. Hence, the physical locations could be in more than 
one time zone. In addition, virtualized services may also operate according to the time zones of 
their users, rather than their physically hosted locations. 
 
Examination and Analysis 
 
Several examination techniques are discussed in the DIP Model once data has been preserved 
and collected, and there is a variety of software tools available to assist an investigator.  
Dedicated forensic tool suites such as Forensic Tool Kit
viii
 or Encase
ix
 are popular commercial 
choices. Sleuth Toolkit
x
 is an open source alternative. These tool suites can be used to perform 
‘pattern matching’ and ‘filtering’, which can involve either searching for specific filenames, file 
types, or content. These tool suites can also be used to discover and recover data that a user has 
attempted to delete.  
During the analysis phase of an investigation, the significance of information artefacts as 
evidence is evaluated. A narrative is developed, supported by the evidence and a timeline to 
explain how a crime was committed. Where appropriate, it may be possible to associate 
particular artefacts with users or user accounts.  
Evidence produced during analysis may also be subject to validation, either through 
comparison with complementary sources, or with previous versions, to gain assurance that the 
evidence has not be altered as a consequence of some analysis technique. 
 
 
 
   Types of Evidence in Clouds 
 
Many types of evidence found in clouds, will likely be similar to that found in conventional 
investigations, including Office application documents, emails and images.  Several new forms 
of evidence will also be available, in particular records of activities of users with clouds. Major 
cloud providers such as Amazon and Google have implemented a number of logging 
mechanisms tracking use within their services: 
 
 Message Log Search - is a service from Google, which allows administrators to make 
queries on email messages. Forensic investigators can also use this search provided they 
can gain access to the administrator account. Using this tool an investigator can find logs 
containing information such as: emails sent on a specific date, account ID identification 
for a specific email, identification of specific email recipients, and the IP address of the 
sending or receiving Mail Transfer Agent (Google, 2011). 
 
 Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) Logging - amongst other logging, Amazon 
provides logging for ‘buckets’ created using Amazon S3. Logging can be configured to 
record requests made against the bucket such as the request type, the resource which the 
request worked and the time and data the of the request (Amazon Web Services, 2010). 
 
To access these logs, an investigator currently needs to access the administrative section of 
the cloud service under investigation. As such logs will be located in the cloud, the 
administrative username and password will be required to access them. Cloud providers could 
assist investigators, although the issues concerning chain of custody discussed above will be 
present. Marty has proposed a framework for recovering logging information during forensic 
investigations involving the cloud (Marty, 2011). 
 
   Validation using Hashing Tools 
 
Software hashing tools are commonly used in conventional investigations to validate the on-
going integrity of data used as evidence.  A hash function is an algorithm for converting arbitrary 
length data strings into fixed length hash values, typically a few hundred bytes in length.  Hash 
functions are designed so that any change in the input data should (with high probability) 
produce a different output hash value. Hash values can therefore be periodically computed for 
disk images, files or other data representing forensic evidence to gain assurance that the evidence 
has not been changed by an analysis (Salgado, 2005). 
Data stored in a cloud can also be subjected to hashing for integrity checking purposes. For 
example, Amazon S3 and Web Services (AWS) have both implemented MD5 hashing 
checksums for objects stored in their services (Amazon Web Services, 2010). In principle, an 
investigator can record these checksums to show that any evidence acquired has remained 
unchanged during the course of the investigation. In addition, this feature may be of future use 
for investigators wishing to store forensic evidence that they have gathered in a cloud 
environment. 
The use of hashing tools implemented, deployed and controlled by cloud providers does raise 
some challenges. As in the discussion on forensic imaging above, the use of external facilities 
draws the provider into the chain of custody.  In addition, the investigator has less opportunity to 
test and evaluate the hashing features in a cloud, compared with tools developed for use on 
conventional desktop PCs. Typically; an investigator can use a selection of tools that implement 
the same hash function to compute a hash for some sample data. Any differences between the 
results produced can be investigated.  However, in a cloud environment, the investigator has only 
a single implementation (the checksum implementation deployed by the cloud provider) to use. 
Consequently, the investigator’s ability to validate the correctness of their tools is limited. 
 
Presentation 
 
Evidence gathered during a digital forensic investigation can be summarized to explain their 
conclusions in the form of a report or briefing. These may then be submitted to a court and an 
investigator could be asked to provide expert testimony and be subject to cross-examination 
(Carrier & Spafford, 2003). Alternatively, the results of an investigation could be used by an 
organization to improve their corporate policy and could evolve as a form of documentation for 
future investigations (Y. Wang, Cannady, & Rosenbluth, 2005). 
 
In the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), expert scientific testimony in trials is 
largely guided by the Daubert standard. The UK Law Commission interprets the four Daubert 
principles as (The Law Commission, 2009): 
  
 ordinarily a key question is whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has 
been) tested; 
 
 a further pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; 
 
 in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court should ordinarily consider the 
known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s  operation; and 
 
 widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence 
admissible, and a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support 
within the relevant scientific community may properly be viewed with scepticism. 
 
The standard places responsibility for assessing the reliability of testimony with the trial 
judge.  The extent to which the method employed to produce evidence conforms to the principles 
of scientific method is used to guide judgements of acceptability. The conduct of forensic 
investigations in cloud environments in both the United States and United Kingdom will 
presumably be subject to the same tests, if the resulting evidence is to be admissible in court.  
The empirical testing of cloud forensic methods may be challenging due to the rapidly 
evolving nature of the technology. Empirical testing of forensic tools typically employs standard 
data sets (Guo, Slay, & Beckett, 2009), but it is unclear how these could be developed for cloud 
forensic methods. Certainly, there is a clear need to develop a standard evaluation method and 
data set for cloud forensics, if results of cloud forensic investigations are to pass the Daubert 
principles. These criteria affect not only cloud investigations but traditional computer forensics 
investigation as well. As Marsico notes: 
 
 ...the court does not have a true universally accepted method to rely upon. To further 
complicate the problem, many self-proclaimed computer forensics experts take what they  
feel are the best aspects of several approaches and create their own methodology.  
(Marsico, 2004)  
 
Expert witnesses could be faced with the additional challenge of having to explain the concept 
of cloud computing to a jury. It must be remembered that juries in common law systems are 
made up of individuals from the general-public, very often, people who only use a personal 
computer to perform simple tasks. It can be expected that before a judge can allow a jury to 
listen to evidence retrieved from the cloud, they must understand what a ‘cloud’ is, and how it 
works. This could further prolong court proceedings and expert witnesses will be faced with the 
daunting task of ensuring juries fully understand the concept of the cloud. 
 
The evolution of cloud computing forensics is in its infancy. Currently there is not a standard 
method or tool set for conducting cloud investigations, or even for evaluating and certifying 
proposed tools. The presentation of evidence derived from a cloud service will likely be 
problematic in the near future. 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
The potential benefits and challenges of cloud computing for digital forensic investigations have 
been discussed by several authors (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009, 2010; Reilly, Wren, & Berry, 2010; 
Ruan, Baggili, Carthy, & Kechadi, 2011; Ruan, Carthy, Kechadi, & Crosbie, 2011; Taylor, 
Haggerty, Gresty, & Hegarty, 2010; Wolthusen, 2009). Reilly et al. (2010) speculate that one 
potential benefit of cloud computing is having data in a centralized location, which can mean 
incidents can be investigated more quickly. Wolthusen (2009) notes that when attempting to 
locate evidence in a distributed environment such as the cloud, major challenges will need to be 
overcome because evidence could be located across several locations making evidence collection 
difficult. The distribution of evidence can be across multiple virtual hosts, physical machines, 
data centres and geographical and legal jurisdictions. The distributed nature of control and 
storage in a cloud (and the ephemeral nature of virtual instances) will also likely make tracing 
activity and re-construction of events more challenging (Wolthusen, 2009). 
Other challenges identified includes a loss of important forensic information such as registry 
entries (on Microsoft Windows platforms) temporary files, and metadata which could be stored 
in the cloud as well as a lack of tools for dealing with investigations involving cloud data centres 
(Taylor, et al., 2010). As part of the Cloud Computing and The Impact on Digital Forensic 
Investigations (CLOIDIFIN) project, Biggs and Vidalis (2009) reported that very few High Tech 
Crime Units (HTCUs) in the UK were prepared to deal with crimes involving cloud computing. 
Even when HTCUs are prepared to investigate such crimes, current legislation for accepting 
digital evidence in court presents further challenges (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009). 
Ruan et al. (2011) define cloud computing forensics as a form of network forensics, arguing 
that cloud environments are essentially a form of public and/or private computer network.  
However, this definition does not incorporate the virtualized nature of clouds, which is likely to 
have a significant impact on forensic investigations beyond the networked aspect. The paper 
proceeds to sketch a process model for forensic investigation in a cloud environment; however, it 
is unclear how the model is to be evaluated. Ruan et al. (2011) reported on a survey of digital 
forensic practitioners. The survey was conducted with the intention of establishing the views of 
practitioners concerning the impact of cloud computing on future digital forensic investigations.  
The results of the survey indicate considerable diversity of opinion within the practitioners 
surveyed. For example, little agreement was reached as to the definition of cloud forensics. 
Taylor et al. (2010) have extensively examined the legal issues surrounding evidence 
retrieved from a cloud environment. Just as in a traditional investigation, any evidence gathered 
from the cloud should be conducted within local laws and legislation. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the Data Protection Act 1998, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, as well as the Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will also apply to 
cloud computing investigations (Taylor, et al., 2010).  
Reilly et al. (2010) and Roussev et al. (2009) have suggested cloud computing environments 
as a basis for conducting forensic investigations. Dedicated virtual instances can be ready and 
waiting on ‘stand-by’ to assist in gathering evidence from an incident or crime. Cloud storage 
can be used to store images gathered from investigations, and the extensive computing resources 
available can also be used to perform brute-force cracking attacks on passwords and encryption 
keys (Reilly, et al., 2010). Roussev et al. (2009) have proposed the use of cloud computing as a 
means of ‘speeding up’ forensics investigations. A framework which takes advantage of 
distributed computing resources was developed and results showed that such an environment 
could assist investigators examine large forensic data sets in real time (Roussev, et al., 2009). 
 
FUTURE WORK 
 
As discussed in previous sections, current issues in the area of cloud forensics investigations 
support the development of an immediate research agenda in the area of procedures, tools, 
methodologies, and specific environments. These issues will be of concern to both the public and 
private sectors. This section specifically examines several areas of research that the authors 
intend to conduct to further understand digital forensics investigations in the cloud that include: 
an analysis of cloud service usage, the effectiveness of acquisition methods, an understanding of 
commercial cloud environments, an investigation of cloud forensic management, and the impact 
of the cloud on mobile devices.  
 
Analysis of Cloud Service Usage 
 
Alternatives to traditional storage are becoming commonplace in increasingly networked 
societies. Cloud service providers such as Amazon, Google and Dropbox are offering 
alternatives to traditional file storage, email and collaboration solutions. As these options 
continue to become available, the likelihood of these environments being investigated increases. 
Initially, this research needs to determine the number of organizations that are utilizing these 
environments. This could be achieved through a targeted in-depth structured survey with 
organizations and through the implementation of broader Web-based surveys. When an 
understanding of how these environments are being utilized has been achieved, then the research 
should examine the existing policies and procedures associated with these environments. Do 
existing policies and procedures address any issues associated with digital forensics and the 
investigation of these environments? 
The second stage of this survey should investigate private sector need for support from police. 
In doing so, it will need to establish the amount of collaboration and support currently provided 
by local, regional and national police. This survey needs to not only investigate existing support 
but examine ideas on improvements or the removal of existing support where it is deemed 
inefficient or unnecessary. Again, this can be accomplished through a combination of in-depth 
structured surveys and broader Web based surveys.  
 
Acquisition Methods for Cloud Environments 
 
The third stage in the investigation needs to evaluate current methods of evidence acquisition 
from the cloud. This includes examining effective ways to capture data from the client and the 
service provider. Will accepted forensic imaging tools effectively capture data from the cloud? If 
current tools are deemed insufficient, can they be modified to capture data or will new tools need 
to be developed to achieve this task? If new tools need to be developed what are the application 
development requirements?  
A cloud test-bed can be used to mimic the main cloud services (SaaS, PaaS or IaaS) offered 
by cloud providers. The authors believe each of these services will require a unique acquisition 
methodology and each service will provide a unique set of challenges that need to be overcome. 
For example, in an IaaS environment an acquisition methodology needs to be developed such 
that forensic ‘images’ can be acquired from the virtual machines running in this environment. 
Each cloud environment could be configured to address known environmental and trust issues 
that exist in these environments. For example, a private cloud located in a financial organization 
is going to have more control over the environment than users of a public cloud. Hence, the trust 
issues associated with user rights, operating system functionality and capability restrictions can 
be minimized in a corporate environment. On the other hand, a public cloud that allows end-
users to utilize multiple operating systems, possesses administrative rights, provides minimal 
audit information, and introduces more complexity and risk into the environment, which makes 
the forensic acquisition of these environments more challenging. These environments raise 
several questions. Can the cloud be suitably stabilized to allow investigators to take an accurate 
representation of the evidence at a specific point in time? Can datasets be developed to 
effectively mimic this environment? With the investigator not having complete control of the 
environment, can the investigator be sure evidence is not in the process of being altered in the 
cloud at that moment in time?  
To complicate the issue, cloud storage providers employing a distributed file-system might 
mandate the development of alternative tools to recognize that such an environment is being used 
and effectively ‘fetch’ all the evidence from various physical locations. There is also the problem 
of encryption that needs to be overcome such that acquired evidence is not effectively a forensic 
‘image’ of encrypted data.  
Once the data capture issues have been resolved, then the type of useful data that can be 
captured on both the client and the service providers needs to be identified. This would enable 
investigators to concentrate requests for data from cloud providers on known artefacts. Evidence 
gathered in this way could conceivably contribute to a revised or completely new cloud 
investigation process model.  
 
 
Commercial Cloud Providers 
 
The fourth stage of the investigation expands the scope of the research to identify potential 
residual artefacts that are currently left by commercial cloud providers. Individual providers will 
be contacted to inquire about potential collaborations in the forensics analysis of data residing on 
public clouds. An example of this stage of the research would be an investigation into Google 
Apps. The client would need to be extensively examined to thoroughly understand and identify 
the footprint it leaves on the operating system. The investigation can then focus on how the client 
stores information. In other words, does it cache a copy of emails or any type of document on the 
hard disk drive? During the experiment, the client can be used to connect to Google Apps for a 
period of time. Documents received through Google Apps can be viewed online without 
downloading local copies to the hard disk. The hard disk of the client computer can then be 
imaged using traditional resources and the data examined. Some of the questions that could be 
investigated include: 
 
 whether it is possible for an investigator to recover email messages including the email 
body and header information; 
 
 the availability of log files for recovery; 
 
 the recovery of documents viewed using Google Docs; and 
 
 how principles of forensic investigation can be applied (i.e. so that evidence is not altered 
during the course of an investigation). 
 
The experiment then could be expanded to other cloud-based storage solutions such as 
Dropbox
xi
, Wuala
xii
, Syncplicity
xiii
 and SpiderOak
xiv
. A data set consisting of a selection of files 
would need to be stored in the cloud using the above solutions. Information gathered from the 
first stage of the experiments can be utilized to establish typical activity in cloud environments.  
A detailed experimental design would need to be developed consisting of a number of file 
manipulations, such as storing, moving and deleting files in order to mimic real world activity by 
a suspect in the cloud. The investigation will help to determine data recoverability from client-
side computers along with identification of potential artefacts created from file manipulation. 
This experiment can also be extended to investigate the clouds’ effect on digital evidence 
timestamps. The reality is that the cloud client and cloud storage server could reside in different 
time zones. By observing the time when manipulations are made to the data set during the course 
of the experiment, the timestamps can be examined and any affects the cloud has on these 
timestamps can be noted. 
 
Cloud Forensic Management 
 
The idea of using the cloud to host a ‘forensic server’ to be used to conduct investigations has 
already been proposed by Reilly et al. (2010). Several issues are raised by this prospect, 
including, for example, the forensically sound transfer of evidence from the source of the 
investigation to the cloud storage. Such a prospect also raises challenges concerning the 
management of the chain of custody for evidence, and the consequences of a security breach 
suffered by the cloud provider. 
Another area of research that is directly relevant to cloud forensics is the growing problem of 
how to handle large data sets (Tabona & Glisson, 2011). With evidence from the cloud expected 
to be much larger than what current investigators are examining presently, how do investigators 
process the evidence effectively along with storing this evidence safely and securely? Does the 
solution for large-scale cloud data processing hashing techniques, customized information 
retrieval solutions, random data sampling, parallel processing solutions or some combination of 
these solutions? One solution for storage could be the use of the cloud itself.  
 
Issues, which can be examined, include: 
 
 ensuring the evidence is unaltered when transferred to and from as well as when stored in 
the cloud; 
 
 ensure that by using the cloud, local laws, such as data protection, are observed if the 
cloud is used to store evidence; 
 
 enforcing environmental and evidential integrity to eliminate unauthorized access along 
with intentional and unintentional modification or deletion of evidence; 
 
 in the event where sensitive evidence (explicit images and videos) are stored in the cloud, 
access to this evidence is limited and other users of the cloud do not have access to this 
material. 
 is it possible to use the computing power of the cloud to augment the process of data 
intensive cases or to improve password cracking capabilities?  
 
Mechanisms to prevent the above, such as encrypting the evidence, could be implemented as 
a potential solution. However, due to the large size of the evidence, this could be a cumbersome 
resolution. Therefore, research should be conducted to determine the most effective and efficient 
security solutions for the cloud. The idea is to provide investigators with appropriate data so that 
they can implement the appropriate level of security for their environment. 
 
Mobile Cloud Device Environments 
 
Coupling increased mobile phone subscriptions with growth in the smart phone markets indicates 
that these devices are continuing to become an integral part of technologically advanced 
societies. With this assimilation, it is only a matter of time before these devices are used in 
conjunction with cloud services. The same surveys to establish use in the corporate and private 
sectors of society need to be implemented in reference to mobile phones and other mobile 
devices like tablets. How many organizations and individuals are currently utilizing cloud 
services on mobile devices? From an organizational perspective, what is the perceived risk and 
have these risk been effectively mitigated through appropriate policies and procedures? These 
devices largely have proprietary operating systems. Experiments need to be designed and 
executed to determine if any residual artefacts remain on the devices when they interact with 
cloud services. Test data sets will need to be developed and implemented to not only test the 
residual artefacts, but also set performance benchmarks for assessing commercial solutions. The 
residual information could plausibly change with the release of every operating system, from the 
various providers, magnifying and complicating this topic. The impact of the use of encryption 
keys to secure cloud access and the storage of these key either on the device or with a third party 
needs to be examined as well. The effectiveness of sandboxing memory areas in mobile devices 
used in conjunction with cloud services is another area that needs to be investigated. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that conventional methods and guidelines suggested for conducting digital 
forensics could well be insufficient in a cloud environment. If current forecasts are correct, more 
businesses and organizations will be moving their data to cloud environments. Together with a 
continued growth in cyber-crime, this transition could mean there will soon be a demand to 
conduct forensics investigations in such environments. Such investigations would currently be 
hampered due to the lack of guidance concerning methods and software tools to retrieve 
evidence in a forensically sound manner. There is also the need for legal issues regarding clouds 
including data retention and privacy laws to be re-examined, following the widespread adoption 
of cloud technologies. Finally, there is also the need for the digital forensics community to begin 
establishing standard empirical mechanisms to evaluate frameworks, procedures and software 
tools for use in a cloud environment.  Only when research has been conducted to show the true 
impact of the cloud on digital forensics, can we be sure how to alter and develop alternative 
frameworks and guidelines as well as tools to combat cyber-crime in the cloud.  
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